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The political economy of energy transitions in Mozambique and South Africa:
The role of the Rising Powers Abstract: In a world in which 'rising powers' are reconfiguring global development trajectories with significant implications for their sustainability, it becomes increasingly important to understand whether and how low carbon energy transitions might be enabled or frustrated by this new global geography of power. Towards this end, this paper makes the case for bringing together insights from three broad sets of literature on: (1) socio-technical transitions; (2) 'the rising powers' as (re)emerging development donors and; (3) energy geographies. In building bridges between these three bodies of scholarship we seek to develop an alternative analytical framework that attends more effectively to the global and domestic political economy of transitions and whose value is illustrated empirically in relation to the growing involvement of Brazil, India and China in the energy systems of Mozambique and South Africa. We argue that this alternative framework provides a better understanding of how the rising powers are influencing the changing relationships between low carbon and fossil-fuel based energy pathways and of the multiple roles they are playing in the development and transformation of energy systems, through the development of 'niches' where innovation can emerge, or in reinforcing or challenging existing 'regimes' or dominant ways of providing energy services.
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Introduction: The 'Rising Powers' and energy transitions in Southern Africa
In recent years the growing importance of 'rising powers' like China, India and Brazil in the African continent has attracted considerable attention and controversy. Their (re)emergence as international development actors has often been discussed principally in terms of their role in the exploitative acquisition of natural resources such as coal, oil and gas and their growing presence in Africa has regularly been represented as a kind of neo-colonial resource 'grab'
characterised by a plundering of Africa reminiscent of the darkest days of empire (Power et al 2012) . What such representations preclude, however, is recognition of the simultaneous and growing involvement of the 'rising powers' in the transfer of renewable energy technologies in Africa and their potential significance in reconfiguring a range of energy systems within the continent. In 2014, for the first time ever, over half of all new annual investment into clean energy power generation globally went toward projects in emerging markets, rather than toward wealthier countries (Climatescope, 2015) whilst "South-South" investment surged to US$79 billion in 2014 from US$53 billion the year prior.
This paper seeks to address the question of how best to theorise these emerging forms of South-South co-operation around clean energy and comparatively draws out the different ways in which China, India and Brazil have facilitated the growth of renewable energy technologies in each country alongside the pursuit of more 'traditional' forms of resource diplomacy designed to enhance access to hydrocarbon resources like coal and gas. It seeks to explore the significance of this engagement and the different forms it is taking in two contrasting countries in Southern Africa, Mozambique and South Africa, characterised by very different energy systems and political economies. In the first section we identify three bodies of literature relevant to the study of emerging energy transitions in Southern Africa 3 and examine their relative utility in understanding the reconfiguration of energy systems in the region. Firstly, we engage with the literature on theorising energy transitions which usefully situates the emergence of new 'niche' technologies, such as renewables, in interaction with incumbent energy 'regimes' such as fossil fuel based power systems and engages with the detail of the practice and politics of these socio-technical arrangements (Geels 2002) . Secondly, we engage with literatures concerned with the 'rising powers' as emerging development donors and global actors in the new 'scramble for Africa' which usefully raises questions about the changing nature of international development cooperation, the growing significance of south-south flows of trade, investment and finance and the geopolitics of resource extraction and diplomacy. Thirdly, we engage with a growing body of scholarship concerned with 'energy geographies' which addresses energy infrastructures, transitions, agencies and materialities and which views 'energy landscapes' as dynamic entities constituted by complex local, national and transnational flows of technology, funding and ideology. We argue that although each of these bodies of scholarship have a number of merits, none of them, on their own, are sufficient and as a result we seek to develop and apply a more integrated and interdisciplinary framework.
In the second section of the paper we then develop an alternative framework that provides a more multi-actor and 'global' reading of the politics of transition by integrating these three groups of literature and by bringing them into conversation with a number of different strands of work within global political economy concerning the role of transnational actors in enabling and constraining particular energy pathways. Engaging with political economy enables a better understanding of the discourses, institutions and interests that shape energy transitions and enhances our understanding of who sets the terms of energy transition and 4 how, whose interests are served as a result and how relations of power within and beyond the state shape the adoption of one energy pathway over another.
Our proposed alternative and integrated framework, we argue, enables a better handle on the (Geels 2002 (Geels : 1257 , a great deal of insight into the nature of socio-technical transitions has been generated through a 'multilevel perspective' (MLP) on transitions. The multi-level approach identifies different sets of processes operating across three conceptual levels -the landscape, regime and nichethrough which socio-technical systems are both sustained and reconfigured.
The 'landscape' of a socio-technical system is seen to comprise of the structuring forces of ideologies, institutions, discourses and political and economic trends that constitute enduring forms of socio-technical organisation. 'Regimes' in contrast are made up of the complex of practices, regulatory requirements, institutions and infrastructures required to achieve particular societal functions, such as housing, mobility or power. This provides a useful point of departure for thinking about the role of incumbent actors involved in fossil-fuel energy systems whose structural dominance in energy investment and policy shapes the spaces 6 available for developing alternatives. 'Niches' meanwhile provide a space within which social and technological learning processes, networking, and expectations develop in relation to alternative forms of socio-technical configuration. Niche spaces can often fail to cultivate the economies of scale and scope to become competitive, particularly without support from the landscape or the regime.
Successful systems are regarded as tending towards stability, held in place through regimes with 'relatively stable configurations of institutions, techniques and artefacts, as well as rules, practices and networks that determine the 'normal' development and use of technologies' (Smith et al. 2005 (Smith et al. , 1493 . The operations of these regimes in turn create both 'path dependency' and 'lock-in' to certain forms of dominant energy socio-technical configuration while others remain 'locked-out' and marginal. It is expected that structural changes in the socio-technical system occur where there are 'alignments' between the three levels resulting in 'transformations' (Geels and Kemp 2007) or in 'transitions' (Geels 2002 (Berkhout et al, 2010; Bridge et al, 2013; Hansen and Coenen, 2014; Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; Murphy, 2001; Raven, Schot and Berkhout, 2012; Rock et al, 2009 (Hegger et al 2007) . This view tends to overlook the informal networks of innovation and diffusion that characterise the development and uptake of many technologies from 'rising powers' in Southern Africa such as cook-stoves or solar PV panels.
Also of potential relevance here is also a growing body of scholarship concerned with the 'rising powers' as emerging development donors and global actors in the new 'scramble for Africa' (Brautigam, 2010; Power et al 2012; Mawdsley 2012; Carmody 2011) Korea, Thailand, Malaysia or the UAE) have been somewhat neglected. Secondly, there has been very little attention given to the role that the rising powers are playing in relation to renewable energy technology in Africa or in the wider reconfiguration of African energy systems. Typically, the focus is more often on extractive industries and efforts to secure access to Africa's hydrocarbon resources, often viewed through geopolitical approaches that frame energy issues in terms of zero-sum games between state actors or that make simplistic distinctions between politics and economics, viewing them as discrete analytical areas (Keating et al, 2012) .
Although a large share of China's investment in African countries has traditionally been in extractive industries and construction, investment in manufacturing has clearly increased in recent years (World Bank, 2015) and there is evidence that the advancement of Chinese 'go out' strategy has often not been properly recognised (Shen and Power, 2016) . Thirdly, there has also often been a failure to adequately disaggregate and historicise the range of different actors involved within each of these (re)emerging powers and a methodological statism that usually ignores wider structural forces (Ayers 2013) , whilst the importance of African agency in mediating these relationships has not always been sufficiently acknowledged.
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Finally, there is also a growing body of literature concerned with energy geographies which usefully raises questions about energy infrastructures as sites of contestation, the development of which has significant ethical and socio-economic implications. The concept of 'energy landscapes' developed in some recent work by geographers (Frantál et al, 2014) urges us to see the landscape of an energy system not as a physically delimited space, but rather as dynamic entities constituted by complex local, national and transnational flows of technology, funding and ideology. Geographers have used the concept to describe the constellation of activities and socio-technical linkages associated with energy capture, conversion, distribution and consumption and the assemblage "of natural and cultural features across a broad space and the history of their production and interaction" (Bridge et al, 2013: 335) . Again, however, much of this work has been focused on the industrialised world with the energy infrastructures, transitions, agencies and materialities that characterise the Global South receiving far less attention. In particular, there has been an upsurge of work on extractive geographies in recent years where political ecology approaches have been popular, but the focus has often been on resources rather than energy -with energy seen as simply an empirical object of inquiry as opposed to an underlying analytical concept (Huber, 2015) .
There is, however, a need to examine more carefully how global energy power politics (e.g.
around resource extraction) intersects with local energy dynamics in Africa (Büscher, 2009 ).
Thus we require a geographical analysis that extends beyond the territories of energy production/extraction (Huber, 2015) . Until recently, energy geography has also largely ignored the culture and politics of energy consumption practices with a constricted view on who "counts" as energy consumers -namely, individuals in the "residential" sector with industrial consumers typically overlooked. It is therefore necessary to 'scale up' the analysis 11 here (Huber, 2015) as well as to consider the ways in which uneven access to energy systems and the resultant energy consumption patterns reflect and intersect with larger social and political patterns of inequality (particularly in developing countries).
In proposing an alternative framework to provide the "unity of vision" that comes from bringing different analytical lenses together.
Towards a global political economy of energy transitions in Southern Africa
In developing a political economy of energy transitions in the Southern African context, we are responding to calls from others who find the 'political economy of energy transitions is a vastly understudied area' (Goldthau and Sovacool 2012: 238) or call for a 'politically oriented literature on sustainability transitions' (Meadowcroft 2011: 70) , a demand some writers have recently started to respond to (Kern 2011; Geels 2014) . Rather than this being merely about bringing institutions or the state into the analysis of actors and power relations which shape the prospects of low carbon energy transformations, drawing on literatures from global political economy we seek to develop a more multi-actor and 'global' reading of the politics of transition. This goes beyond the analysis of inter-state resource diplomacy common to existing literatures on 'rising powers' to look within and across the state at some of the key political economic factors that shape landscapes, regimes and niches.
In terms of how best to understand the degree of power Southern African countries have to set the terms of their own transition, literatures within global political economy can help to get a better handle on the power, capacity and autonomy that states have to secure and negotiate different outcomes and the implications for diverse pathways to more sustainable forms of energy production. In addressing the neglect of wider structural forces in particular, insights from critical International Political Economy (IPE) can be applied to understand the scope that states have to establish their own development policies in a context of what has been referred to as 'disciplinary neo-liberalism' (Gill 1995) where the structural power of capital in a globalised economy, supported by global economic institutions, is used to discipline states adopting policies and interventions that run counter to prevailing neo-liberal orthodoxy. The wave of World Bank influenced power sector reform and electricity privatization programmes undertaken in Africa throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008) and the drive for market solutions to energy problems are indicative of this trend, as is the withdrawal of support from states adopting more interventionist modes of regulation.
This usefully highlights how the type and depth of power sector liberalization inhibits freedom of manoeuvre to select energy pathways that depart from prevailing neo-liberal policy orthodoxy (Tellam 2000) . At the same time literature which examines the 'policy autonomy' and 'development space' (Wade 2007; Gallagher 2005) Political economy perspectives enable us to get at how the terms of 'transition' are set and by whom and in so doing, usefully check the assumption that transitions are made up of open ended choices. They offer an understanding of power and its effects on the terrain upon which transitions are negotiated among a range of domestic, regional and international and public and private actors enabling a better understanding of the emerging patterns of energy access and the (uneven) distribution of 'rising power' investments in projects, innovation and infrastructure. In particular, IPE approaches draw attention to the forms of power that derive from control over the production, technology and finance and investment that will underpin a transition, visible in the influence of incumbent regimes as opposed to those entrepreneurs seeking to protect and promote particular niches.
This sheds light on the uneven access to energy and the benefits of rising power investments in the energy sector since the interests of elites involved in making key decisions on energy investment, technologies and institutions do not align readily with those without energy access, or those who suffer the harmful consequences of extraction, processing, and consumption of fossil fuels, and yet are often excluded from the benefits of these processes. It also raises questions about state-capital-labour relations which usefully focuses attention on, for example, the role of trade unions representing the large numbers of workers employed in the mining and energy industries and the influence this may have on the speed and depth of 14 transition away from fossil fuels (Newell and Mulvaney 2012) . In South Africa, for example, there are some important policy initiatives around local manufacturing content, job creation and black economic empowerment that are having a significant bearing on the nature of the country's energy transition and emerging renewable energy landscapes.
Our analysis thus seeks to examine the discourses, institutions and interests that shape energy transitions and energy policy. In doing so we build upon the work of Newell et al (2014) Although complex state-market interactions are a key part of the focus here, our approach does not view states as the only, or even the dominant, actor in energy governance. Sub-state, inter-state, and supra-state actors, as well as non-state actors both market and non-market are also important. We thus seek to develop an analytical framework that is able to show how energy regimes are constituted through a dispersed 'state' that involves complex relationships between multiple actors and operates across borders and one that can account for the evergrowing role of transnational actors and emerging transnational spaces of south-south cooperation around clean energy. A focus on global production networks and value chains is also useful here in that it helps offset more macro-scale, geopolitical interpretations by taking an actor-centric approach to understanding the variegated, country and industry-specific 15 development implications of south-south trade flows (Horner 2015) particularly those around renewable energy (c.f. Dunford et al 2013; Curran 2015) .
Work on the rising powers also helps to identify and contextualise the transnational spaces of transitions by attending to questions of geopolitics, diplomacy and international relations and in so doing enables us to get a better understanding of the discursive, institutional and material power behind China, Brazil and India's energy diplomacy and private investments in Southern Africa's energy systems.
In terms of what is driving these investments (both state and private), there are emerging literatures on energy statecraft and diplomacy (Dalgaard, 2012; Santos Vieira de Jesus, 2013; Wilson, 2015) that have usefully examined the investments that rising powers like Brazil are making in renewable energy (Fulquet and Pelfini 2015) and which complement more traditional preoccupations with the political economy of resource diplomacy. The growing literature on energy geographies can also be brought to bear in seeking to understand the geopolitics and political economy of energy transitions in Southern Africa.
Geographers have shown that energy infrastructures, including electricity generation, transmission and distribution facilities, can be understood as sites of contestation and as spatial expressions or material articulations of dominant political-economic ideologies and geographic imaginaries. Prospects for new flows of energy bring together disparate social groups into conversations about allocation, costs/benefits and acceptable end uses whilst the development of energy infrastructure has significant ethical and socio-economic implications which are not diffused or experienced evenly across space (Calvert, 2015) . Decisions about which resources to prioritise and where to build new infrastructure can thus (re)produce uneven economic development at regional scales (Bouzarovski et al., 2012) along with conditions of energy poverty at local and household scales. The energy geographies literature has also shown that energy production and use translates directly into control over space so that energy is an important physical medium through which to express state authority, to extend the reach of the state and to exert territorial control. It also shows that the attempted shift towards renewable energy is productive of new energy landscapes and new spatialities, some of which are highly contested, raising questions about which landscapes should be made and ultimately for whom.
The political economy of energy infrastructure also needs to be understood in historical context. In Southern Africa and other parts of the global south, energy regimes are shaped by histories of colonisation, apartheid, nationalism, state-led development and market-oriented 17 liberalisation. This helps us to make sense of the path dependence that shapes the contemporary features of both country's energy systems or the ways in which decisions taken in the past limit the options available today. As Goldthau and Sovacool (2012:235) explain, the nature of an electricity system means that it "exhibits strong path dependencies due to the large investments made into grids and plants, perpetuating a mostly fossil fuel based system of electricity production and consumption" and is therefore unable to adapt quickly to sudden changes. It is thus important that such energy investments are adequately historicised.
Understanding which 'niche' technologies are supported or neglected in the course of transition, how power relations operate around the 'regime' and the extent to which incumbent power can successfully resist 'landscape' pressures requires a deeper understanding of the domestic political economy of South Africa and Mozambique. Work on the minerals-energy complex (MEC), for example, describes South Africa's economic accumulation strategy, historically predicated on the relationship between mining, manufacturing and electricity, and also provides a framework of analysis for the country's political economy (Fine and Rustomjee 1996) . The historical basis of the MEC is a regime of accumulation based on low cost state-owned electricity production (via the public utility Eskom), cheap labour and large-scale national and international corporate capital tightly bound to the energy and mining sector (Swilling and Annecke 2012: 218) . As one of the world's largest mining countries, South Africa's dependence on historically abundant sources of low-cost coal for 96 percent of its electricity has resulted in a highly energy-intensive economy.
This low-cost coal, coupled with the availability of low cost labour (a key legacy of apartheid) has led to the generation of electricity for minerals-based export-oriented industry 18 which forms the basis of its 'minerals-energy complex' (Fine and Rustomjee 1996) . The apartheid era produced an electricity sector exclusively directed towards the consumption needs of industry and the elite, largely white, minority aimed at shoring up their power through energy independence amid isolation from the international community. This historical background is critical to understanding how the structural power of actors in the incumbent energy regime is used to shape and contest the prospects for alternatives such as renewable energy technologies, through, for example, control over market access for independent power producers. South Africa's electricity system has been dominated until now by its monopoly utility, Eskom, while some 44 percent of the country's electricity is consumed by its Energy Intensive User's Group, whose 31 members include some of the world's largest resource and mining conglomerates. The MEC offers a way of understanding power and critical networks between South Africa's financial sector, parastatals, government, the private sector and the country's Industrial Development Corporation (Freund 2010) . This contributes to an analysis of 'the social forces of production' over 'technical solutions to the economics of transition' (Fine and Rustomjee 1996: 4) . Such an approach permits an analysis of historical power relations, structural change and the interests of dominant actors and thus avoids reducing a complex debate to a technocratic perspective on governance or, in other words, a 'policy fix' (Büscher 2009: 5) .
Despite considerable diversification in the electricity mix and a significant decline in the contribution that mining and minerals-beneficiation makes to the country's economy, coalbased vested interests as key players in the minerals-energy complex still dominate at the level of supply and demand in electricity.
In neighbouring Mozambique, a 'troubled transition' (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995) from
Marxism-Leninism to free market capitalism has also produced a very particular political economy that shapes the country's energy sector. Historically there has been a heavy dependence on foreign donors and creditors who have played a key role in shaping and defining Mozambique's development agenda. The post-war turn towards neo-liberalism and privatization has led to a proliferation of state capture and administrative corruption within the Frelimo party-state (Pitcher 2008) where there is now arguably a greater concern with maintaining relationships of patronage and rent-seeking than with providing services to citizens (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2010). Power remains heavily concentrated in Frelimo, which has increased its hold during the liberal period through successful monopolization of access to donors and international networks together with a privatization process and natural resources boom that has allowed it to further centralise wealth and power (Sumich 2010) .
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Frelimo has heavily manipulated the state power utility Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM) to achieve its own political objectives with electrification efforts closely shaped by geopolitical imaginaries and a desire to extend the reach of the state and to exert territorial control in remote regions. The development of the national electricity infrastructure and rural electrification efforts have often lacked transparency or been mired in allegations of corruption as projects have regularly been awarded to companies with links to the main political and economic elites (Nhamire and Mosca 2014) . Mozambique also has its own emergent MEC that builds on a long history of an economy based on an extractive system of capital accumulation and is currently pursuing a vision of development that is heavily centred on extractive industries (especially coal and gas) and energy-intensive mega-projects (Kirshner and Power, 2015) .
Southern Africa's energy transitions: an integrated framework for analysis
Within Mozambique and South Africa high-carbon and low-carbon pathways to development are being pursued in parallel and interconnected ways, so this is not a simple choice between pathways, but rather a case of multiple pathways emerging across a fragmented energy system that consists of multiple regimes. In this regard we engage with the socio-technical transitions framework not to produce a kind of yes/no assessment of the presence or absence of transitions but rather to understand the dynamics of niche development in the context of powerful regimes.
In both Mozambique and South Africa the rising powers are playing a role in the continued entrenchment of high carbon pathways. India and China have been significant export markets for South African coal and even as attempts at alternative energy pathways are made there 21 remain very substantial commitments to building new coal-fired power generation facilities as the heavy reliance on coal created by the MEC continues . In
Mozambique rising power interest in the energy sector has predominantly concentrated on securing access to fossil fuel resources through resource diplomacy following the recent discovery of significant coal and gas reserves (Kirshner and Power, 2015) . In 2013 the Indian High Commission to Mozambique predicted 'an inevitable competition for markets and
[natural] resources between China and India' but was confident that in Mozambique India will be able to 'checkmate China' (Wikileaks 2013) . Indeed, India has in recent years stepped up its diplomatic efforts around natural resources and renewable energy in Mozambique, signing a bilateral accord in October 2014 to enhance co-operation in the oil and gas sector followed by an MoU promoting co-operation in the renewables sector signed in October 2015 (Macauhub 2015) . The struggle for access to Mozambique's newly exploited offshore gas resources in Cabo Delgado province has also brought Chinese companies including the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation for utility-scale privately generated renewable electricity. Prior to the introduction of this programme South Africa managed to preserve some developmental space by resisting pressures to liberalise its electricity sector and open up competition to private energy providers (Baker et al 2014) . The RE IPPPP initiative has so far attracted R168-billion (US$14bn) of private investment into the supply-stressed electricity sector, allocating approximately 6.5 GW of generation capacity, largely from wind, solar PV and concentrated solar power (CSP). Thus there are parallel and competing pathways being pursued both in terms of technology and the nature of how this technology should be procured -whether via the state utility Eskom or independent power producers (Baker 2015) .
RE IPPPP also requires that renewable energy developers meet criteria for socio-economic and community development and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). However, implementing these can be problematic. For instance, as one engineer working in the renewable industry stated in interview (November 5 th 2013): "Meeting the economic commitments of the project can be a huge challenge…. not all developers will coordinate with each other over labour and socio-economic issues as the industry is too competitive".
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There are thus particular state-capital-labour relations in South Africa shaping key policy domains such as energy and industry and the scope for their reform where, for example, trade unions have a powerful role in shaping the speed and depth of transition away from fossil fuels by protecting the large numbers of workers employed in the mining and energy industries or where the emphasis on black job creation and concerns about the need for local content and community development have significantly shaped the emerging low carbon transition. As one member of government stated in interview (November 28 th 2013) "the holistic advantage to the country needs to be managed. If the company coming in from abroad is not comfortable with these criteria, then it will struggle". South Africa's attractiveness to investors, the size of the market and its strategic location in the region and low level of aid dependence, place it very differently to Mozambique in its ability to set the terms of its own transition and negotiate more favourable terms with donors and investors from Europe and increasingly the rising powers. Reflecting the high levels of aid dependence in Mozambique, off-grid rural electrification and grid extension has frequently been funded by grants and soft loans from European bilateral donors (Power and Kirshner, 2016) who have played a key role in configuring the landscape of energy politics and closely shaped the Mozambican state's capacity to pursue different renewable energy pathways. Thus far Mozambique has had a much lower degree of policy autonomy and developmental space around energy and consequently less capacity to withstand pressures from domestic, regional and international and public and private actors. This may be set to change in the years ahead as hydrocarbon revenues increasingly come online and as dependence on aid consequently decreases, affording the state more room for manoeuvre (Power and Kirshner, 2016) .
Despite the fact that RE IPPPP has been celebrated globally as a leading model for independent power procurement, and also for its progressive socio-economic development and community ownership requirements, ensuring universal energy access is not the main objective of commercial energy developers whose business models are determined by a desire for high returns over short time frames (Baker and Wlokas 2015) . As one technical advisor for an engineering company stated (in interview, November 5 th 2013) "it has become quite a competitive and commoditised industry now". The Mozambican state has also recently increased the licensing and divestment of power generation operations to Independent Power Producers (IPPs) amid serious supply shortfalls, often with no competition or public tender, which have in many cases produced cheaper energy for largescale industrial consumers, but raised costs for the majority (Nhamire and Mosca 2014) . In both cases there is thus a prioritisation of commercial providers of energy in ways which appear to have little to do with the expansion of energy access or increasing its affordability.
As a result, the socio-economic benefits of the development of energy infrastructure are not being diffused or experienced evenly across the energy landscape, reinforcing the key question of whose energy needs are represented and acted upon in policy.
What is also noticeable, however, mirroring international trends (Lema and Lema 2012) , is that emerging market companies are also beginning to support renewable 'niches' alongside the more dominant role of European and US companies in South Africa's wind and solar PV sector. The RE IPPPP process in South Africa provides one space for niche development. There is no specific Chinese 'go out' government policy focused on promoting renewable energy companies. Instead it is the saturation of China's domestic wind and solar power industries and the surplus of production capacity in China that is one of the main drivers pushing Chinese firms towards the South Africa market (Shen and Power, 2016) . Chinese firms see in Southern African markets an opportunity to upgrade from equipment producers to project owners/operators and unlike their rivals from India and Brazil they can draw on extensive financial support and detailed market and political analyses available from quasistate agencies like the China Development Bank, Exim and Sinosure (Shen and Power, 2016 In part this is because there are multiple fractions of the state invested in different energy pathways in Mozambique, leading to the emergence of cleavages based upon competing fractions of both state and capital. As a result, there are significant differences in the resources and priority given to solar PV and mini-hydro as opposed to coal, gas and largescale hydro where potential rents are higher and more easily captured by state elites and incumbent regime interests, the largest beneficiaries.
It is also important to recognise the differences that exist within the state. discourses on hydroelectricity foments a powerful type of 'post-colonial amnesia' given that some of the planned projects are just a short distance from Cahora Bassa, the construction of which during the late colonial period had significant implications in terms of population displacement, lost livelihoods and deteriorated ecosystems.
Indeed, this focus on hydroelectricity, rather than opportunities for small-scale distributed renewables, appears to be the priority for some of the rising powers interested in Mozambique has prioritised large-scale hydro partly as a result of the path dependencies created by Cahora Bassa which saw most of the electricity generated there exported to neighbouring countries (principally South Africa). The transfer across national borders of electric power has become an important source of revenue generation with MIREME arguing that electricity companies should be allowed to get involved in foreign trade and that
Mozambique could not build a new dam based solely on its own electricity needs (AllAfrica, 2015) . Indeed, Mphanda Nkuwa's construction depends on Eskom's commitment to buy most of its electricity (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013) We suggest that international political economy provides valuable insights about the degree of policy autonomy and developmental space that states in Southern Africa have to negotiate the terms of their own energy transitions and helps to correct the a-political and a-material basis of much transitions theorising. It does so by foregrounding relationships between the state, capital and labour, while placing them in a more global context, and fostering an appreciation of the uneven power to create and contest transitions based on control of production, technology and finance. We also suggest, however, that IPE's focus on the complex interactions between states and markets and between states, capital and labour can be usefully complemented by the more granular focus of transitions work on how niches and regimes produce and resist change within particular sites of socio-technical innovation and competition in a manner which is subject to broader (global) political economies, but not reducible to them. With respect to the role of the rising powers in reconfiguring energy systems in the two countries, we drew on, but also sought to nuance, approaches concerned with the changing nature of international development co-operation, the growing significance 32 of south-south flows of trade, investment and finance and the geopolitics of resource extraction and diplomacy. In drawing on the energy geographies literature we sought to show that Southern Africa's energy infrastructures can be understood as sites of contestation and as spatial expressions or material articulations of dominant political-economic ideologies and geographic imaginaries and we conceptualised the region's 'energy landscapes' as dynamic entities constituted by complex local, national and transnational flows of technology, funding and ideology.
We sought to go beyond the narrow inter-state focus on resource diplomacy to look within and beyond the state at uneven power in the competition over competing energy trajectories and to develop a genuinely transnational understanding of energy, one that is able to track global value chains and production networks and to capture complex linkages between diverse transnational actors from development donors to national energy companies. This, we In terms of developing a future, more global, agenda for undertaking research on low carbon transitions beyond European contexts, it is crucial to further develop the conceptual engagement between different strands of (global) political economy and theories of sociotechnical transition in order to capture the complex assemblages of practices, technologies and actors that shape energy transitions. In all cases an account of where a country is located in the global geography of energy has to be complemented by an appreciation of what is unique about the historical, material, political and economic context in which energy transitions are unfolding and which will strongly configure the form they take and who benefits from them. Engaging more directly with the political economies of transition enables a better understanding of how energy regimes serve to promote the interests of some actors 34 and interests at the expense of others and whether and how global institutions can support transitions that are both lower carbon and socially just (Newell and Mulvaney, 2012; Swilling and Annecke 2012) . This implies a more dynamic understanding of the emergent cleavages within states and within capital seeking to either protect conventional accumulation activities or experiment with new forms of lower carbon accumulation or indeed both trajectories simultaneously. This is critical for conceptualizing the role of the 'rising powers' in regimes, as at once 'part' of the governing of existing energy regimes and as 'external' actors seeking to intervene, invest and innovate within energy systems.
